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1 Introduction
This study analyzes the relation between corporate taxation and accounting conservatism.
Accounting conservatism requires higher verification standards to be included in book in-
come for gains than for losses. Losses are therefore recognized timelier while gains are
deferred into the future (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a,b). A timelier loss recognition pro-
vides early information on value decreasing events and is associated with a broad array of
favorable implications for stakeholders. Accounting conservatism positively impacts the
value relevance of earnings (Brown, He, and Teitel, 2006), resolves information asymme-
tries (Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 2014), decreases adverse effects of CEO overconfidence
(Ahmed and Duellman, 2013) and managerial risk-taking (Kravet, 2014), decreases the
likelihood of future stock price crashes (Kim and Zhang, 2016), facilitates external borrow-
ing while fostering investment (Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 2016) and increases creditors’
recovery rate in case of default (Donovan, Frankel, and Martin, 2015).
While an asymmetric recognition of gains and losses in book income under conservative
accounting provides stakeholders with early and relevant information, it simultaneously
shifts taxable income into the future and defers tax payments. In periods of steady cor-
porate tax rates a deferral of tax payments decreases their present value (Watts, 2003a).
Additionally, an increase in accounting conservatism can materialize in a significant tax
benefit if a tax rate cut is imminent. Then losses are recognized during the higher taxed
earlier period while taxable income is shifted into the lower taxed later period. A tax
rate differential between periods therefore provides an incentive to increase conservatism
shortly before the tax rate is cut. Recent research showed that firms respond to tax rate
differentials across borders (Collins, Kemsley, and Lang, 1998; Bartelsman and Beetsma,
2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Klassen and Laplante, 2012) and time (Guenther, 1994;
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Maydew, 1997; Lin, Mills, and Zhang, 2013; Andries, Cools, and van Uytbergen, 2016) to
decrease their accounting effective tax rate (ETR) (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008).
The incentive to increase accounting conservatism prior to a tax rate cut, however, may
be mitigated by a lower degree of book-tax conformity. Thus, an increase in accounting
conservatism that affects book income is not necessarily reflected in taxable income on a
one-to-one basis. Whereas financial accounting standards try to provide early and useful
information to stakeholders, tax accounting often follows a revenue-raising function and is
subject to political processes (Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Tax accounting
therefore often requires less conservative accounting, as reflected, for example, in longer
depreciation periods. Hence, a low degree of book-tax conformity potentially undermines
the tax benefit associated with an increase of accounting conservatism shortly before a tax
rate cut. Against this backdrop, this study analyzes the association between future tax
rate cuts on the firms’ level of accounting conservatism and countries’ degree of book-tax
conformity as a potential mediator.
Recent research on the determinants of accounting conservatism strongly supports a
theory of accounting conservatism serving as a contracting device that helps to overcome
information asymmetries and agency conflicts. For example, firms with higher informa-
tion asymmetries between managers and investors experience higher levels of conservatism
(LaFond and Watts, 2008). Furthermore, accounting conservatism increases in the share
of outside directors with stronger monitoring incentives (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) and
decreases in the controlling owner’s ownership share (Bona-Sanchez, Perez-Aleman, and
Santana-Martin, 2011). Thus, accounting conservatism primarily varies with firms’ infor-
mation environment. Firms that face larger information asymmetries between managers
and stakeholders as well as firms with stronger corporate governance enforce higher levels
of conservatism (Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 2009) to provide better and timelier informa-
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tion to stakeholders. Further work in this area focuses on the interaction and determinants
of conditional and unconditional conservatism. Unconditional conservatism is triggered
with the inception of the asset and independent from bad news or triggering events (Basu,
1997). In contrast, conditional conservatism depends on news or triggering events such as
necessary impairments to an asset (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). For example, Qiang (2007)
shows that taxation induces unconditional conservatism only. This study, however, does
not explicitly account for changes in the tax rate and the incentives that go along with
tax rate cuts. I try to shed more light on the question if taxation induces conditional
conservatism. In contrast to prior research, I show that there is a strong positive associ-
ation between conditional conservatism and taxation, but only when there are imminent
changes in the tax rate.
Using three different proxies for accounting conservatism including the firm-level timeli-
ness of earnings (C-Score) (Khan and Watts, 2009) based on the Basu timeliness coefficient
(Basu, 1997), cash flow and earnings skewness (Givoly and Hayn, 2000) and the persis-
tence of negative accruals (Givoly and Hayn, 2000), I find that decreases in the corporate
tax rate are significantly and positively associated with increases in firms’ conditional
conservatism in the year prior to the tax rate cut. This effect is particularly pronounced
in a sub-sample of firms located in countries with a high degree of book-tax conformity.
Furthermore, the findings are robust when limiting the analysis to firms that concentrate
the majority of their operations in the country in which the tax rate is cut. In contrast,
my tests do not provide any support for the prediction that decreases in the corporate tax
go along with increases in unconditional conservatism.
There are several challenges in testing the relation between future tax rate cuts and
accounting conservatism. Firstly, corporate tax rates remain fairly stable over longer pe-
riods of time and affect a broad number of firms making it difficult to infer causal effects.
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I control for these potential concerns by drawing on a large sample of firms across 18
different countries and a 15 year sample period (1995-2010) that covers a battery of tax
rate changes. Secondly, book income does not necessarily equal taxable income. Thus, tax
accounting rules may partly reverse conservative accounting in financial reports. There-
fore, a deferred dollar of accounting income may not fully map into a deferred dollar of
taxable income depending on the degree of book-tax conformity the firm faces. I address
this challenge and approximate each country’s degree of book-tax conformity using an em-
pirical book-tax conformity measure developed by Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010). An
empirical measure of book-tax conformity overcomes concerns with other measures based
on subjective assessments. Third, it is empirically challenging to distinguish discretionary
and mechanically driven accounting conservatism. Although managers face discretion in
accounting choice to steer the level of conservatism, recent literature shows that proxies
used to capture conservatism also might as well capture the non-discretionary part of
accounting conservatism (Roychowdhury and Martin, 2013; Lawrence, Sloan, and Sun,
2013). I try to address this concern and proxy accounting conservatism using three dif-
ferent measures including the firm-specific proxy C-Score developed by Khan and Watts
(2009). Khan and Watts (2009) show that C-Score is varying at the firm-level with spe-
cific events such as a significant increase in litigation risk. Lastly, multinational enterprises
commonly pay taxes in various countries. Tax payments are usually based on local un-
consolidated financial statements while empirical conservatism proxies mostly depend on
consolidated financial data. In a robustness test I limit my analysis to firms that hold at
least 90% of their assets, generate at least 90% of their sales and earn at least 90% of their
income in the country in which the tax rate is cut. The results hold and are even stronger
in this sub-sample of firms concentrating their activities to the country in which the tax
rate is cut.
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This paper aims to contribute to several streams of literature. Firstly, this paper
adds to the stream of literature assessing the determinants of accounting conservatism
(Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 2009;
Bona-Sanchez, Perez-Aleman, and Santana-Martin, 2011). Secondly, I shed additional
light on the consequences of corporate tax avoidance especially tax avoidance via inter-
temporal profit shifting (Guenther, 1994; Maydew, 1997; Lin, Mills, and Zhang, 2013;
Andries, Cools, and van Uytbergen, 2016). Thirdly, this paper contributes to the ongoing
and topical debate on the benefits and/or drawbacks of book-tax conformity in financial
accounting (Desai, 2005; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005; Atwood, Drake, and Myers, 2010).
The paper proceeds as follows. After formulating my hypotheses using a model that
explains the relation between anticipated tax rate cuts on firms’ level of accounting con-
servatism and moderating effects of book-tax conformity in section 2, I present variations
in corporate tax rates across 18 different countries from 1995 to 2010 in section 3. Section
3 also provides more details on the conservatism and book-tax conformity measures used
in the study as well as details on the sample used. In section 4 I present the empirical
tests and results and section 5 concludes.
2 Model and hypotheses
In the following I construct a model to predict the effect of corporate tax rate changes
on firms’ level of accounting conservatism. I assume a firm that acquires a capital stock
K in t = 0 that decays over two periods to keep the model as simple as possible. The
capital stock economically decays at a rate δ over time. The accounting system in place
depreciates K at a rate γ with γ ≥ δ. The firms’ accounting system is unconditionally
conservative if it depreciates assets faster than their actual economic lifetime (γ > δ) or
unbiased if accounting depreciation equals economic decay (γ = δ). In the first period the
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capital stock experiences an unexpected downward shock to its market value . Hence,
the capital stock’s total loss in economic value amounts to (δ + )K in the first period
whereas accounting depreciation is γK in the first period. The accounting system requires
an impairment of the asset to its market value (1 − δ − )K whenever (δ + )K > γK
(news dependent or conditional conservatism). As a result, unconditional conservatism
is independent from any triggering events such as economic shocks to the value of the
asset and pre-empts conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). The required
impairment of the asset in the first period therefore is given by
λ¯ = δ + − γ. (1)
Subsequently, the required impairment λ¯ is decreasing in the level of the accounting sys-
tem’s unconditional conservatism γ. I further assume that the capital stock is fully decayed
after two periods without any salvage value (K = 0 in t = 2).
I assume the firm earns cash flows x in each period t resulting in pre-tax accounting
income of x − (γ + λ)K + x − (1 − (γ + λ))K = 2x − K. The firm has to pay taxes
at tax rates τt (t ∈ (0, 1)) based on taxable income. The tax rate drops at the end of
the first period with probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 so τ1 ≥ τ2 has to hold. Taxable income may
diverge from pre-tax accounting income, because tax accounting provides for different
accounting rules than financial accounting. Taxable income in both periods is given by
x−α(γ+λ)K+x− (1−α(γ+λ))K where α denotes the degree of the country’s book-tax
conformity. I assume that the tax system has a strict revenue raising function (Hanlon,
2005) for the welfare state and does not provide any tax incentives (e.g., faster depreciation
schemes), thus 0 < α < 1 has to hold.
The manager privately observes the shock to the market value of the asset  in period
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1 and chooses the impairment level λ for financial accounting purposes. The manager can
truthfully communicate the economic downward shock to the capital stock’s market value
via the accounting system so λ = λ¯ has to hold. Alternatively, the manager can exploit
the information asymmetry to impair the asset to a privately optimal degree so λ 6= λ¯.
Deviating from λ¯ triggers additional convex costs to the firm and/or manager c(λ−λ¯)
2
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where c denotes a fixed cost factor. Costs can be thought of as personal costs of effort
to the manager to implement a privately optimal impairment level, additional expected
concealment costs or penalties triggered by audits or negative capital market reactions to
decreasing profits. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the model.
Figure 1: Sequence of events
t=0 τ1
Firm acquires
capital stock K
t=1 τ2
Tax rate τ drops
with probability p
Manager observes λ¯
Manager chooses λ∗
t=2
End of firm
The manager chooses the optimal impairment λ∗ at the end of the first period to
maximize the firm’s after-tax profits given by
pi = 2x−K− τ1(x−α(γ+λ)K)− (p τ2 +(1−p)τ1)(x−α(1− (γ+λ))K)− c(λ− λ¯)
2
2
(2)
with the first order condition
∂pi
∂λ
= 0. (3)
The maximization problem solves for the optimal impairment rate λ∗ in t = 1 given by
λ∗ = λ¯+
p α K (τ1 − τ2)
c
. (4)
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The model predicts several effects that are discussed in the following. Optimal im-
pairment λ∗ in period 1 should be interpreted as follows. Conditional conservatism is
increasing in λ∗. The capital stock K is increasingly written down in the first period
shifting taxable income to the lower taxed period 2. To assess the effect of a tax rate cut
(τ2 < τ1) on the optimal impairment I use the following comparative static
∂λ∗
∂τ2
= −p α K
c
< 0. (5)
I require strictly positive values for p, α and K. Thus, the optimal impairment rate and
conditional conservatism is decreasing in τ2. Put differently, the higher the expected tax
rate reduction in period 2, the higher the level of conditional conservatism in period 1. I
therefore predict the following
H1: Conditional conservatism is positively associated with the tax rate differential
between two periods (τ2 − τ1).
The model also predicts the effect of the country’s degree of book-tax conformity on the
optimal impairment rate in the first period indicated by the following comparative static
∂λ∗
∂α
=
p (τ1 − τ2) K
c
> 0. (6)
Thus the optimal impairment rate λ∗ is strictly increasing in the country’s book-tax confor-
mity. The intuition is that if book-tax conformity is high, conservative accounting choices
in financial accounting map into taxable income to a larger extent relative to countries in
which book-tax conformity is low.
H2: A positive association between firms’ conditional conservatism and a future tax
rate cut is especially pronounced if book and taxable income is strongly conformed (high
book-tax conformity).
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3 Data and sample
3.1 Corporate tax rate variation across countries
To answer whether firms increase conservatism in financial reporting shortly before a tax
rate cut requires sufficient variation of corporate tax rates within countries and over time.
However, countries do not frequently adjust their corporate tax rates making it necessary
to look at larger time spans. Over the last three decades there has been a significant down-
ward trend in corporate tax rates across countries while tax bases were usually broadened
(also known as tax rate cuts cum base broadening). This downward trend is evident from
Figures 2, 3 and 4 that show the trend of various countries’ corporate tax rates from 1990
to 2015. Figure 2 presents corporate tax rates for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France and Germany. Figure 3 shows corporate tax rates for Greece, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway and New Zealand. Figure 4 represents Poland, Portugal, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden and the UK.
< Insert figure 2, 3, 4 here >
On average the 18 countries outlined decreased their corporate income tax rate from
41.26% in 1990 to 26.70% in 2015. However, countries adjusted their corporate tax rates
differently over time. Whereas some countries significantly decrease their corporate tax
rates within one year (e.g., Austria in 2004 by 9% or Germany in 2008 by 10%), other
countries have staggered corporate tax rate changes over longer periods of time. The
United Kingdom, for example, decreased their corporate tax rate from 30% in 2008 to
20% in 2015 in annual steps ranging from 1% to 2%. In the used sample, I count in total
105 decreases in the corporate tax rate across 18 countries from 1995 to 2010. The average
tax rate differential from one year to another year is 3.4%. I count eight major corporate
tax rate cuts (≥ 5 percentage points) across six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany,
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France, Italy and Norway) without any changes in the tax rate two years prior or after the
drop in the tax rate. I use this variation in corporate tax rates across countries and time
to analyze the question if firms’ level of conservatism is positively associated with future
tax rate cuts.
3.2 Measuring accounting conservatism
To assess the effect of corporate tax rate changes on firms’ level of conservatism in financial
reporting, I use three measures of accounting conservatism to proxy for conditional and
unconditional conservatism. All variables are defined in detail in Table 1 in the appendix.
The first proxy to measure conditional conservatism is C-Score (Khan and Watts, 2009)
based on the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure. The Basu (1997) asymmetric
timeliness measure captures the responsiveness of earnings to good and bad news proxied
by stock market Returns. Specifically, earnings are regressed on stock market Returns,
an indicator variable for negative Returns and the interaction between Returns and the
indicator for negative Returns. If the accounting system is conservative then earnings pick
up bad news (negative stock Returns) relatively quicker than good news (positive stock
Returns) as indicated by a positive coefficient on the interaction term. The Basu (1997)
asymmetric timeliness measure is based on annual cross-sectional regressions providing
variation in conservatism only over time and not firms. In contrast, C-Score provides both
time and cross-sectional variation as a proxy for conditional conservatism. Khan and Watts
(2009) argue that a firm’s level of conditional conservatism depends on its market-to-book
ratio, its Size and Leverage providing cross-sectional variation across firms. C-Score is
frequently used in recent studies that assess determinants and implications of conditional
conservatism (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) or Lara, Osma, and Penalva (2014)).
C-Score measures the relative timeliness of earnings to bad news over good news at
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the firm level and is estimated as follows. The Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure
serves as a start and is given by the following regression model
Xi = β0 + β1 Di + β2 Ri + β3Di ×Ri + i, (7)
where i is the firm index, X is net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged
market value of equity, R denotes annual Returns to proxy for news obtained by accu-
mulating monthly Returns starting from the fourth month after the firm’s fiscal year end,
D is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if Returns (news) are negative (R < 0) and set
to 0 otherwise. The coefficient β2 picks up the responsiveness of earnings to good news
(positive stock Returns). β2 +β3 captures the responsiveness to bad news (negative stock
Returns) and β3 captures the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad news relative to
good news. Khan and Watts (2009) argue that coefficients β2 and β3 are linear functions
of the firm’s firm-year characteristics firm size (Size), market-to-book ratio (MTB) and
Leverage ( Leverage) and are defined as follows
G-Score = β2 = µ1 + µ2 Sizei + µ3 MTBi + µ4 Leveragei, (8a)
C-Score = β3 = λ1 + λ2 Sizei + λ3 MTBi + λ4 Leveragei, (8b)
where Size is the natural log of market value of equity, MTB is the firm’s market-to-book
ratio and Leverage is total debt scaled by market value of equity. Substituting equation
(8a) and (8b) into regression model 7 yields the annual cross-sectional regression model
to estimate the responsiveness of earnings to good news (G-Score) and the incremental
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responsiveness of earnings to bad news over good news (C-Score) at the firm level
Xi = β1 + β2Di +Ri(µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3MTB + µ4Leveragei)
+DiRi(λ1 + λ2Sizei + λ3MTBi + λ4Leveragei)
+ (σ1Sizei + σ2MTBi + σ3Leveragei + σ4DiSizei
+ σ5DiMTBi + σ6DiLeveragei) + i.
(9)
The coefficients µi and λi are estimated using annual cross-sectional regressions and there-
fore vary over time, but not in the cross-section. The annual coefficients µi and λi are
then used to estimate G-Score (8a) and C-Score (8b). Cross-sectional variation in C-
Score is added through cross-sectional variation in firm-level characteristics (Size, MTB
and Leverage). Thus, C-Score measures firm-level conservatism across years. Conditional
conservatism is increasing in C-Score.
The second measure for conservatism, Con-Acc, measures unconditional conservatism
and captures the persistent use of negative accruals (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Ahmed,
Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris, 2002). I define Con-Acc in line with prior research
as net income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations plus deprecia-
tion expense deflated by average total assets and averaged over the previous three years,
multiplied by negative one (Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Unconditional conservatism is
increasing in Con-Acc.
The last measure to proxy for unconditional conservatism is Skewness and is defined
as the difference between cash flow skewness and earnings skewness (Givoly and Hayn,
2000; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Put formally, earnings and cash flows skewness are
defined as (x−µ)3/σ3 where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of earnings and
cash flows over the last five years. Unconditional conservatism is increasing in Skewness.
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3.3 Measuring book-tax conformity
To assess the effects of book-tax conformity on the association between future tax rate
cuts and accounting conservatism, I draw on the book-tax conformity measure developed
by Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010). Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010) define book-
tax conformity as “the flexibility that a firm has to report taxable income that is different
from pre-tax book income”. They base their measure of book-tax conformity on the con-
ditional variance of yearly tax expense in a country for a given level of pre-tax income.
To construct the measure Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010) use annual cross-sectional
regressions of current tax expense on pre-tax book income, estimated foreign pre-tax
book-income and total dividends all scaled by total assets. Accordingly, the root mean-
squared error (RMSE) from the regression provides an unbiased estimate of the standard
error indicating the range of tax expense the firm can report for a given level of pre-tax
income. Higher (lower) values of RMSE indicate a broader range of reported tax expense
per unit of pre-tax income suggesting a lower (higher) degree of book-tax conformity for
the country-year.
< Insert Table 2 here >
I construct the Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010) yearly book-tax conformity measure
for each of the 18 countries in the sample. Table 2 reports the average value of RMSE
over the whole sample period for each country and provides values of RMSE provided in
Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010) for comparison. I construct a rank for each country
in each year BTCRank that indicates the country’s degree of book-tax conformity in
the respective year according to RMSE. A higher (lower) rank indicates a higher (lower)
degree of book-tax conformity. The results are comparable to reported values of RMSE
by Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010). Differences in values are potentially attributable to
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differences in sample years. The sample years used in Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010)
range from 1992 to 2005. My measure is constructed for sample years from 1995 to 2010.
I acknowledge that there are additional measures to proxy for a country’s degree of re-
quired book-tax conformity. For example, Watrin, Ebert, and Thomsen (2014) construct a
measure of a country’s degree of book-tax conformity using firms’ unconsolidated financial
accounts. This approach potentially provides a more accurate measure as tax payments
of European firms are based on unconsolidated financial statements. In contrast, consoli-
dated financial accounts comprise tax payments in various countries and are subject to a
consolidation process. However, the measure is limited to European countries. Although
my sample mainly comprises European countries, data limitation on firms’ unconsolidated
accounts prior to the year 2007 restrict my analysis on the Atwood, Drake, and Myers
(2010) book-tax conformity measure. Using an empirical measure overcomes challenges
with other existing measures on book-tax conformity that rank countries based on sub-
jective assessments of a country’s degree of book-tax conformity such as Alford, Jones,
Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) or Hung (2000).
3.4 Sample and descriptive statistics
To test my hypotheses I draw on firm-level and stock return data retrieved from the
Datastream and Worldscope database provided by Thomson Reuters to construct a panel
of 37,880 firm-year observations ranging from 1995 to 2010. A 15-year time span from 1995
to 2010 covers a broad range of tax rate changes in various countries. The final sample
comprises firms located in 18 different countries. As conditional conservatism proxies
require stock return data to measure the timeliness of bad news recognition (proxied by
Returns) in firms’ earnings, my sample is restricted to publicly listed firms. Table 3
provides an overview of the number of firms and firm-year observations per country in the
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sample.
< Insert Table 3 here >
To build the sample, I start with all listed firms in the Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope
database from 1995-2010 (168,227 observations) and drop observations with missing ob-
servations required for (in)dependent variables (less 115,025). Further I drop observations
with stock prices less than USD 1 in line with Khan and Watts (2009) to construct C-
Score. Next, I eliminate firm-year observations with market values less than USD 10,000
and observations in the 1st and 99th percentile of observations (less 14,017) to prevent
outliers from distorting the results (Becker, Jacob, and Jacob, 2013). The final sample
comprises 37,880 firm-year observations and 4,835 unique firms across 18 countries. I
acknowledge that eliminating observations in the 1st and 99th percentile of observations
significantly reduces the sample size. However, the sample’s final size is comparable to
other studies using Worldscope data (e.g. (Becker, Jacob, and Jacob, 2013)). Table 4
presents the sample selection in detail.
< Insert Table 4 here >
Table 5 summarizes all descriptive statistics of the sample. Although my sample differs
from other studies in that I also include non-U.S. firms, my results for C-Score, Skewness
and Con-Acc are comparable. The mean (median) of C-Score is 0.062 (0.023) for my
sample which is comparable to other studies. For example, Ahmed and Duellman (2013)
report a mean C-Score of 0.060 while Lara, Osma, and Penalva (2014) report a mean C-
Score of 0.098. Also the mean of Con-Acc is comparable to Ahmed and Duellman (2013).
The mean of Skewness is less compared to other studies. Note that Con-Acc and Skewness
have fewer observations (26,844 and 9,543) since both measures require consecutive data
points over time. However, the comparable results of C-Score, Skewness and Con-Acc
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provide some comfort that the proxies are correctly estimated. The average firm in the
sample is relatively large (mean for Size is 15.415) compared to studies that sample U.S.
firms. I attribute this to the fact that capital markets outside the U.S. are usually limited
to larger firms. The mean (median) of Leverage is 0.835 (0.342), of Sales growth 0.086
(0.047) and of Op. cashflow 0.146 (0.108). The mean (median) of MTB is 1.896 (1.357)
and of CEO shares 0.004 (0.001). In line with prior research I set missing values for R&D
expense equal to zero resulting in a left skewed distribution of R&D expense with mean
(median) of 0.019 (0.000). The descriptive statistics are comparable to conventional levels.
< Insert Table 5 here >
4 Empirical tests and results
First, I test if firms’ level of accounting conservatism is positively associated with an
imminent tax rate cut. I define a large tax rate cut as a reduction in the corporate
tax rate of 5 percentage points or more without any changes in the corporate tax rate
two years before or after the tax rate is cut. However, I cannot control for additional
changes affecting the tax base. While there potentially has not been a significant change
in the effective tax rate, earlier research on the salience of statutory tax rates provide
some comfort that firms respond to changes in the statutory tax rate and not so much to
changes in the effective tax rate (Buettner and Ruf, 2007; Blaufus, Bob, Hundsdoerfer,
Kiesewetter, and Weimann, 2013; Amberger, Eberhartinger, and Kasper, 2016).
In total, the sample comprises five large tax rate cuts across four countries: Austria,
Belgium, Germany and Italy (twice). Figure 5 and 6 provide a first indication of firms’
level of conditional conservatism around a large tax rate cut. Figure 5 pools all firm-year
observations of the four countries and plots the average value of C-Score over time. The
year in which the tax rate is cut is indicated by t = 0. Hypothesis 1 indicates that firms
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increase conditional conservatism when a tax rate cut is imminent. Three years before the
tax rate cut the mean of C-Score across the four countries is about 0.02 and increases to
0.25 on year before the tax rate is cut. In the following three years the mean of C-Score
decreases again to approximately 0.08. Accordingly, C-Score increases and peaks in the
year before the tax rate cut just to flatten again after the tax rate cut providing some
first evidence in support of hypothesis 1. The response in C-Score is comparable to event
studies provided by Khan and Watts (2009) who show a steep increase in conditional
conservatism around an increase in firms’ litigation risk.
< Insert Figure 5 here >
Figure 6 provides an indication for the shift in the distribution of C-Score. Two years
before the tax rate cut the distribution of C-Score is centered around its mean with a high
density. In the year of the tax rate cut the distribution of C-Score shifts to the right.
< Insert Figure 6 here >
I further perform the following multivariate tests. In a first step, I regress each of the
three conservatism measures on a dummy variable Event that takes value one if a large
tax rate cut is one year ahead and a vector of control variables X
Coni,t = γ0 + γ1 Eventk,t+1 + δ Xi,t + , (R1)
where Coni,t is one of the three conservatism measures C-Score, Skewness and Con-Acc
for firm i in year t. The subscript k indicates variables for country k. If firms’ level of con-
servatism is positively associated with a large tax rate cut in the next year (hypothesis 1),
then the coefficient γ1 should be positive and significant. I further construct a sub-sample
of firms in countries with high book-tax conformity (HighBTC) and low book-tax confor-
mity. HighBTC takes value one if the country ranks above the median of BTCRank in
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the current year and zero otherwise. I estimate R1 separately for both sub-samples to test
hypothesis 2. If a positive association between the level of conservatism and a large tax
rate cut is stronger in countries with high book conformity, then the coefficient γ1 should
be larger in the HighBTC sub-sample. In line with previous research I control for firms’
Size as larger firms tend to be less conservative in accounting (Givoly and Hayn, 2007) as
well as profitability (Returns and Op. cashflow). Furthermore, I expect firms with higher
degrees of managerial ownership measured by CEO shares to apply less conservative ac-
counting as these firms draw on more informal ways to decrease information asymmetries.
In line with Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) I also control for the market-to-book ra-
tio. Following Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris (2002) I expect Leverage
to affect conservatism who find that firms with higher conflicts between bondholders and
shareholders induce higher levels of conservatism. Sales growth may affect unconditional
conservatism due to increases in accruals (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). R&D expenses
are usually directly expensed increasing unconditional conservative measures. Lastly, I in-
clude country and industry-year fixed effects to account for unobserved and time invariant
effects. I cluster all standard errors at the firm-level (Petersen, 2009).
< Insert Table 6 here >
Table 6 presents results of estimating equation (R1). In columns (1) to (4) I report
the effect of a major tax rate cut on firms’ conditional conservatism measured by C-Score
and a long-run measure over three years 3 yr. C-Score. The coefficient γ1 on Event is
positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001) indicating that firms’ level of conditional
accounting conservatism is increasing if a large tax rate cut is one year ahead. In contrast,
for Skewness (columns (5) and (6)) and Con-Acc (columns (7) and (8)) the coefficient γ1
on Event is not statistically significant at conventional levels providing some evidence that
future tax rate cuts have no effect on firms’ unconditional conservatism. Together, these
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findings provide support for hypothesis 1 that firms’ level of conditional conservatism is
positively associated with future tax rate cuts.
< Insert Table 7 here >
In Table 7 I present results of estimating equation (R1) separately using a sub-sample of
firms facing high book-tax conformity and firms located in countries with low book-tax
conformity. The coefficient γ1 on Event is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001)
in the sub-sample of firms with strong book-tax conformity (column (1)). In contrast,
the coefficient γ1 on Event is negative and statistically significant at the 5%-level in the
sub-sample of firms with low book-tax conformity (column (4)). In contrast, for Skewness
(columns (5) and (6)) the coefficient γ1 on Event is not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels (columns (2) and (5)). For Con-Acc γ1 is not statistically significant in
the high book-tax conformity sub-sample (column (3)), but positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 10%-level in the low book-tax conformity sub-sample (column (6)). These
results give support for hypothesis 2 that the increase of conditional conservatism is con-
centrated in firms with high book-tax conformity. The previous results provide support for
both hypothesis 1 and 2. Whereas firms’ conditional conservatism is positively associated
with a large tax rate cut in the next year, unconditional conservatism is not. This effect,
however, is concentrated in firms facing strong book-tax conformity.
In a second test, I use a continuous measure for tax rate changes ∆CIT to test my
predictions. In particular, I regress the change of each conservatism measure (∆Con) on
the expected change in the corporate tax rate one year ahead (∆CIT ) and a vector of
control variables X. All variables are in first-differences (∆).
∆Coni,t = β0 + β1 ∆CITk,t+1 + δ ∆Xi,t + . (R2)
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Positive values of ∆CIT indicate a tax rate cut. Therefore, if tax rate cuts in the next
period are positively associated with the conservatism level in the current year (hypothesis
1) the coefficient β1 should be positive and significant. This effect should be pronounced
in the high book-tax conformity sub-sample if hypothesis 2 holds.
Table 8 presents results of estimating equation (R2) for the full sample. For ∆C-
Score the coefficient β1 is positive and significant (p < 0.001) (column (1) and (2)). For
∆Con-Acc β1 is insignificant. For ∆Skewness β1 is positive and significant at the 10%-
level. These results corroborate hypothesis 1 that firms’ level of conditional conservatism
is positively associated with a reduction in the tax rate in the following year.
< Insert Table 8 here >
Table 9 presents the results of estimating equation (R2) using the high and low book-
tax conformity sub-sample. For C-Score, the coefficient β1 on ∆CIT is positive and
significant (p < 0.001) in the high book-tax conformity sub-sample and negative and
significant at the 1%-level in the low book-tax conformity sub-sample. This provides some
support for hypothesis 2 that a positive association between conditional conservatism in
the current year and a tax rate cut in the next year is especially pronounced for firms facing
high book-tax conformity. In contrast, β1 is insignificantly different from zero for Skewness
in the high book-tax conformity sub-sample and for Con-Acc in both sub-samples.
< Insert Table 9 here >
Together the results suggest that firms’ level of conditional conservatism is positively
associated with a tax rate cut in the next period. The positive association is especially
pronounced for firms facing high book-tax conformity. In contrast, the results suggest
that there is no positive association between unconditional conservatism and future tax
rate cuts.
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4.1 Robustness tests
To corroborate the previous results I conduct the following additional robustness tests.
A potential concern using consolidated data could be that the data also includes income
and tax payments associated with foreign operations that are not affected by a tax rate
cut in the headquarters’ country. An increasing share of foreign income and tax payments
would then mitigate the firms’ incentive for increasing conservatism prior to a tax rate
cut in the home country. This concern would curb the previous results. To mitigate
this concern I run the previous tests in a sub-sample of domestic firms that cumulatively
meet the following requirements. Firstly, the firm holds at least 90% of its assets in the
headquarters’ country. Secondly, the firm earns at least 90% of its pre-tax income in the
headquarters’ country. Lastly, the firm has at least 90% of sales in the headquarters’
country. In total this leaves me with a sub-sample of domestic firms of 8,607 firm-year
observations for C-Score and all control variables. I estimate both equation (R1) and (R2)
again using the sub-sample of domestic firms.
< Insert Table 10 here >
Table 10 and 11 present results for the tests using the sub-sample of domestic firms.
All previous results also hold in the sub-sample of domestic firms. More importantly, the
coefficients γ1 and β1 are larger and statistically significant compared to the full sample
used in the previous tests indicating that the effect is larger for firms with the majority
of operations in the country in which the tax rate is reduced. For C-Score the coefficient
γ1 on Event increases from 0.247 using the full sample (Table 6, column (1)) to 0.697
(Table 10, column (1)) using the full domestic sub-sample. Note that the adjusted R2
almost doubles from 4.8% using the full sample to 9.5% using the full domestic sub-
sample suggesting that more of the variation in C-Score is explained by home-country
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operations. Also the coefficient γ1 on Event increases from 0.816 using the full sample for
high book-tax conformity firms (Table 7, column (1)) to 1.201 using the domestic sub-
sample for high book-tax conformity firms (Table 10, column (4)) corroborating hypothesis
1. Furthermore, the coefficient γ1 on Event is insignificant for domestic and low book-tax
conformity firms (Table 10, column (7)) providing more evidence for hypothesis 2. I find
comparable results for estimating equation (R2) again in a sub-sample of domestic firms
(see Table 11).
< Insert Table 11 here >
The robustness tests provide some more evidence for hypothesis 1 and 2 and show that
the effect is especially pronounced for firms concentrating the majority of their operations
in the home country.
5 Conclusion
This study analyzes the relation between reductions in the corporate tax rate and firms’
conditional and unconditional accounting conservatism. In particular, I analyze whether
firms’ accounting conservatism is positively related to future tax rate cuts. Additionally,
I test if a positive relation between accounting conservatism and future tax rate cuts is
specifically pronounced when book and taxable income is strongly conformed. Because
timelier loss recognition shifts taxable income into the lower taxed future, firms have an
incentive to increase conservatism shortly before the tax rate is cut. If book-tax conformity
is strong then timelier loss recognition for book income also affects taxable income.
Using a sample of firms across 18 countries and 15 years (1995 to 2010), I find that
firms’ conditional conservatism is significantly positively related to future tax rate cuts if
book and taxable income is strongly conformed. In contrast there is no significant relation
between unconditional conservatism and future tax rate cuts. These results are especially
22
pronounced for firms that concentrate the majority of their operations in the country in
which the corporate tax rate is cut.
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Appendix
Figure 2: Corporate Tax Rates (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany)
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Figure 3: Corporate Tax Rates (Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand)
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Figure 4: Corporate Tax Rates (Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom)
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Figure 5: Accounting Conservatism over time around major tax rate cut
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This figure shows the level of C-Score over time relative to the year the tax rate is cut. The
figure pools all observations from countries with a a large tax rate cut (≥ 5 percentage points
without any tax rate changes two years prior or after the tax rate cut). t = 0 indicates the year
in which the tax rate is cut.
Figure 6: Density of C-Score
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This figure shows the kernel density of C-Score two years prior a large tax rate cut (≥ 5
percentage points without any tax rate changes two years prior or after the tax rate cut) and in
the year of the tax rate cut. Observations from countries with a large tax rate cut are pooled.
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Table 1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Accounting conservatism measures
C-Score First annual coefficients λi and σi are estimated with annual cross-sectional
regressions using regression model 9. λi and σi vary over time, but not across
firms. λi and σi are then used to estimate C-Score and G-Score by plugging
the coefficients into equations 8a and 8b. C-Score and G-Score vary over time
and across firms. For a detailed description see section 3.2 and Khan and
Watts (2009).
Con-Acc Net income before extraordinary items (Worldscope: WC01551) less cashflow
from operations (Worldscope: WC04201) plus depreciation expense (World-
scope: WC01151) deflated by average total assets (Worldscope: WC02999)
and averaged over the previous three years, multiplied by negative one. See
also: Ahmed and Duellman (2013).
Skewness Skewness is defined as the difference between cash flow and earnings skewness:
(x− µ)/3σ3, where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of earnings
and cash flows over the last five years. See also: Givoly and Hayn (2000),
Ahmed and Duellman (2013).
Tax measures
∆CIT Corporate tax rate differential between year t and year t+1 (CITt−CITt+1).
Thus, positive values of ∆CIT indicate a decrease in the tax rate in the next
year.
Event Dummy variable set equal to one if the corporate tax rate drops at least by
5% from t to t + 1 and no changes in the corporate tax rate occur two years
before or after the tax rate drop.
BTCRank Scaled rankings of countries’ degree of book-tax conformity according to (At-
wood, Drake, and Myers, 2010). The ranks are based on the root mean-
squared error (RMSE) from the following model estimated by country-year:
CTEt = α + β1PTBIt + β2ForPTBI + β3DIVt + t, where CTE is current
tax expense (WC01451), PTBI is pre-tax income (WC01401), ForPTBI is
foreign pre-tax income (WC07126) and DIV is dividends paid (WC04551).
CEO shares CEO shares is the percentage of closely held shares (Worldscope: WC08021)
in total outstanding shares (Worldscope: WC05301).
Domestic Dummy variable that takes value one if the firm reports less than 10 percent
of income (Worldscope: WC08741), sales (Worldscope: WC08731) and assets
(Worldscope: WC08736) as foreign (see also Lester and Langenmayr (2017),
Creal, Robinson, Rogers, and Zechman (2014), Osswald and Sureth-Sloane
(2017)).
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Table 1: Variable definitions continued
Variable Description
Control variables
Earnings Earnings is net income before extraordinary items (Worldscope: WC01551)
scaled by lagged market value of equity.
Leverage Leverage is defined as total debt (Worldscope: WC03255) deflated by market
value of equity.
MTB MTB is end-of-year market value of equity (Datastream: MV) deflated by
book value of equity (Worldscope: WC03501).
Op. cashflow Operating cashflow is the cashflow from operations (Worldscope: WC04201)
deflated by market value of equity.
R&D expense R&D expense is annual R&D expenses (Worldscope: WC01201) deflated by
market value of equity.
Returns Returns are annual Returns compounded from monthly Returns beginning
the fourth month after the firm’s fiscal year end.
Sales growth Sales growth is the percentage of annual growth in the firm’s total sales
(Worldscope: WC01001).
Size Size is the natural log of market value of equity. (Datastream: MV)
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Table 2: Book-tax conformity by country
Avg. RMSE
Avg. RMSE
(Atwood et al.
2010)
BTCRank
Japan 0.006 0.008 0.810
Portugal 0.006 n.a. 0.762
South Korea 0.007 n.a. 0.757
Poland 0.007 n.a. 0.746
Austria 0.008 0.009 0.731
Finland 0.008 0.010 0.681
Italy 0.008 0.010 0.646
Spain 0.008 0.008 0.625
Greece 0.010 0.014 0.576
Netherlands 0.010 0.009 0.525
New Zealand 0.010 0.013 0.488
Denmark 0.010 0.010 0.470
France 0.010 0.008 0.438
United Kingdom 0.012 0.010 0.301
Sweden 0.012 0.012 0.278
Norway 0.014 0.013 0.229
Germany 0.014 0.016 0.213
Belgium 0.014 0.014 0.192
This table presents the average book-tax conformity over the sample pe-
riod from 1995-2010 by country based on Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010).
BTCRank is based on the root mean-squared error (RMSE) from the following
model estimated by country-year: CTEt = α + β1PTBIt + β2ForPTBI +
β3DIVt + t. The average RMSE by (Atwood, Drake, and Myers, 2010) is
given for comparison (sample period 1992-2005). Higher (lower) RMSE in-
dicate lower (higher) book-tax conformity. BTCRank is the average rank of
each country over the whole sample period. Higher (lower) BTCRank indi-
cates higher (lower) book-tax conformity.
Table 3: Sample composition
Country N (Firms) N (Obs.) Country N (Firms) N (Obs.)
Austria 56 363 Netherlands 70 597
Belgium 87 660 Norway 90 644
Denmark 92 778 New Zealand 48 345
Finland 91 762 Poland 116 569
France 390 3,107 Portugal 31 201
Germany 383 2,700 South Korea 596 3,010
Greece 73 266 Spain 93 695
Italy 167 1,020 Sweden 176 1,356
Japan 1,587 15,802 United Kingdom 689 5,005
This table summarizes 37,880 firm-year observations across 18 countries in my
sample from 1995-2010.
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Table 4: Sample Selection
Step Description Observations
dropped remaining
1 All firms listed in Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope
Database from 1995-2010 for the 18 countries se-
lected
168,227
2 Drop observations with missing or market value
(MV) < $ 10.000
76,767 91,460
3 Drop observations with missing or negative book
value (WC01551)
8,731 82,729
4 Drop observations with missing or negative total as-
sets (WC02999)
12 82,717
5 Drop observations with missing sales (WC01001) 75 82,642
6 Drop observations with missing net income before
extraordinary items (WC01551)
30 82,612
7 Drop observations with missing total debt
(WC03255)
84 82,528
8 Drop observations with missing operating cash flow
(WC04201)
847 81,681
9 Drop observations with missing common shares out-
standing (WC05301)
52 81,629
10 Drop observations with missing closely held shares
(WC08021)
28,427 53,202
11 Drop observations with less than $1 of stock price
in line with Khan and Watts (2009)
1,305 51,897
12 Drop observations of all dependent and independent
variables not within 1st and 99th percentile of ob-
servations Becker, Jacob, and Jacob (2013)
14,017 37,880
This table presents the steps undertaken to retrieve the sample used. The final sample
comprises 37,880 firm-year observations for 4,835 firms. Table 3 presents an overview of
the distribution across countries.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max.
C-Score 37,880 0.062 0.794 -3.480 -0.064 0.023 0.116 4.612
Skewness 9,543 0.080 1.537 -5.298 -0.557 0.042 0.652 7.768
Con-Acc 26,844 0.004 0.019 -0.073 -0.004 0.003 0.013 0.089
Size 37,880 15.415 2.981 9.427 12.851 15.891 17.753 21.718
Returns 37,880 0.080 0.423 -1.174 -0.181 0.057 0.322 1.740
MTB 37,880 1.896 1.796 0.142 0.853 1.357 2.254 16.185
Leverage 37,880 0.835 1.522 0.000 0.082 0.342 0.903 17.011
Sales Growth 37,880 0.086 0.258 -0.635 -0.030 0.047 0.145 2.235
Op. Cashflow 37,880 0.146 0.182 -0.384 0.061 0.108 0.183 1.851
R&D expense 37,880 0.019 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.368
CEO shares 37,880 0.004 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.166
This table presents descriptive statistics of the main variables for 4,835 firms and 37,880 firm-year
observations over the sample period from 1995-2010. Observations for all continuous variables in the
1st and 99th percentile are eliminated. Variables are defined in Table 1.
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